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Is Door-to-Door Canvassing Effective in Europe?
Evidence from a Meta-study across Six European
Countries
YOSEF BHATTI, JENS OLAV DAHLGAARD, JONAS HEDEGAARD HANSEN
AND KASPER M. HANSEN*
A vast amount of experimental evidence suggests that get-out-the-vote encouragements delivered through
door-to-door canvassing have large effects on turnout. Most of the existing studies have been conducted
in the United States, and are inspiring European mobilization campaigns. This article explores the
empirical question of whether the American ﬁndings are applicable to Europe. It combines existing
European studies and presents two new Danish studies to show that the pooled point estimate of the
effect is substantially smaller in Europe than in the United States, and ﬁnds no effects in the two Danish
experiments. The article discusses why the effects seem to be different in Europe compared to the United
States, and stresses the need for further experiments in Europe as there is still considerable uncertainty
regarding the European effects. While one possible explanation is that differences in turnout rates explain
the differences in effect sizes, the empirical analysis ﬁnds no strong relationship between turnout and
effect sizes in either Europe or the United States.
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To what extent do campaigns to increase voter turnout affect the likelihood of participation? This
question has received considerable attention in the academic literature, especially since Gerber and
Green’s seminal ﬁeld experiments in New Haven, Connecticut.1 Perhaps one of the most studied
mobilization tools is door-to-door canvassing, which is widely used in US campaigns.2 In a recent
review of the literature, Green, McGrath and Aronow3 identiﬁed seventy-one canvassing
experiments with a precision-weighted average complier average causal effect (CACE)4 of 2.536
percentage points and a 95 per cent credible interval of (1.817, 3.255). The effect of door-to-door
* Danish Institute for Local and Regional Government Research (email: yobh@kora.dk); Department of Political
Science, University of Copenhagen (emails: jod@ifs.ku.dk, jhh@ifs.ku.dk and kmh@ifs.ku.dk/www.kas-
permhansen.eu). The authors thank the volunteers in Copenhagen and Randers for participating in the two door-
two-door experiments, Jens Kristian Rasmussen for coordinating the effort in Randers, and Mariann Malchau
Olsen and Ane Reese Mikkelsen for excellent research assistance. They thank Donald P. Green, Florian Foos,
Frederik Hjorth and participants at the Danish Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting 2015 for valuable
comments. This project was supported by the Danish Council for Independent Research (grant no. 12-124983).
Data replication sets are available at http://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/BJPolS and online appendices are
available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000521.
1 Gerber and Green 2000.
2 E.g., Bedolla and Michelson; Gerber and Green 2000; Green, Gerber, and Nickerson 2003; Matland and
Murray 2012; Nickerson 2008; Enos and Fowler 2016.
3 We do not consider American studies conducted after Green, McGrath, and Aronow (2013).
4 The CACE is the average effect among those who take the treatment if and only if assigned to it
(i.e., compliers). In the literature (e.g., Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996, 448) it is also referred to as the LATE
effect (Local Average Treatment Effect) (Gerber and Green 2012, 142).
canvassing is one of the largest and most robust in the get-out-the-vote (GOTV) literature and
almost rivals the effect from social pressure mailings.5
A few published studies have focused on the effectiveness of door-to-door canvassing outside
the United States. Guan and Green6 mobilized students in a 2003 Beijing election, John and
Brannan7 canvassed British voters in the 2005 election, and Giné and Mansuri8 targeted female
voters in rural Pakistan. The three studies observed varying levels of effects, from modest to
impressive. The relative efﬁciency of door-to-door canvassing, and to some extent inspiration
from the 2008 Obama campaign,9 has led to its increased popularity outside the United States.
For example the Danish Social Democrats relied heavily on this strategy in the 2011 general
election after campaign strategists had volunteered on the Obama campaign.10 However, most
studies concerning the effect of door-to-door canvassing are focused on the US context, which
has prompted some skepticism regarding the generalizability of the results to Europe as
European campaigns adopt US strategies. Following John and Brannan,11 several (currently
unpublished) studies from across Europe ﬁnd mixed results.12 This article compiles evidence
related to door-to-door canvassing in Europe and presents ﬁndings from two new studies
conducted in the context of a Danish election.
Studying the effects of door-to-door canvassing in Europe is interesting for at least three reasons.
First, in several European countries turnout is much higher than in the United States, especially
considering that many of the existing American studies target voters in low-salience elections. This
means a ceiling effect might occur in Europe, as there is less scope for door-to-door campaign
mobilization than in the United States.
Secondly, there could be cultural differences. Door-to-door canvassing is more frequently
used in the United States than in most European countries, apart from perhaps the UK.13 This
means that voters in Europe are not as used to being exposed to political messages on their
doorstep, and they might ﬁnd it invasive to be confronted with political campaigns at their front
door. European canvassers and canvassing organizations are also simply less experienced than
many US canvassing organizations that have built up experience in a number of elections. This
might lead to less inﬂuential door-to-door-campaigns in Europe.14
Thirdly, institutional differences might vary the impact of door-to-door campaigns. Most US
studies are conducted in ﬁrst-past-the-post systems, which are considerably more candidate
focused than most15 European proportional representation (PR) systems. It is possible that this
makes doorstep conversations more relevant and effective in the United States compared to
Europe (setting Britain aside for a moment) because it is possible to have more relevant and
engaging discussions about the character of individual candidates, whereas in countries like
Denmark discussions would have to be more abstract and focus on parties.16 Furthermore,
US studies are often conducted in competitive districts where the chance of being pivotal is
5 Green, McGrath, and Aronow 2013.
6 Guan and Green 2006.
7 John and Brannan 2008.
8 Giné and Mansuri 2011.
9 Pons 2016, 6.
10 Jason and Kollerup 2014.
11 John and Brannan 2008.
12 Cantoni and Pons 2016; Foos and John 2016; Nyman 2014; Pons 2016; Pons and Liegey 2016; Ramiro,
Morales, and Jiménez-Buedo 2012.
13 Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2007.
14 Ramiro, Morales, and Jiménez-Buedo 2012.
15 However, see for instance Bengtsson et al. (2014) for a discussion of the diversity among systems.
16 We would like to thank one of the reviewers for this point.
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especially high, which might also increase the effectiveness of campaigns even if an
individual’s vote, on average, has greater leverage in a PR system. Another institutional
difference is the need for registration in the United States, which, among other things, provides
canvassers with information about individuals who are motivated to vote and their party
afﬁliation. This might lead to more effective campaigns.
In total, the compiled theoretical arguments point in the direction of smaller effects in Europe.
Yet ultimately it is an empirical question. In this article, we compile evidence from published
and unpublished door-to-door canvassing experiments in Europe and present two new studies
from Denmark. The main ﬁnding from a meta-analysis is that the average effect of European
studies is well below the mean effect from the United States. In fact, though the point estimate is
positive at 0.78 percentage points, based on the studies conducted so far it is still too early to say
whether door-to-door canvassing is an effective strategy in Europe at all. The conﬁdence
interval (CI) of the estimate is (−0.16, 1.71), so it cannot be ruled out either that the effect is
quite substantial. We emphasize that this conclusion is in part due to a limited number of studies
– many of which have low power, including our own. This does not change the fact that at this
point the best estimate is that door-to-door canvassing is not the same silver bullet in Europe as
in the United States, but that more research is needed.
DOOR-TO-DOOR STUDIES IN EUROPE
Existing Literature
To our knowledge, the only published study that examines the effectiveness of door-to-door
canvassing in Europe is John and Brannan’s17 study of the 2005 British general election. The
experiment included 2,510 individuals and found an intention-to-treat (ITT) effect
of 3.6 percentage points for the non-partisan canvassing and a CACE of 6.7, with a standard
error of 3.7.
In recent years, several additional high-quality (currently unpublished) studies have been
conducted. Ramiro, Morales and Jiménez-Buedo18 conducted a partisan campaign in the
Spanish city of Murcia during the 2011 local elections. They found negative treatment effects,
though the exact size of the CACE is unclear due to uncertainty about the compliance rate.
Therefore, this study will not be included in the meta-analysis.
Pons and Liegey19 studied 23,773 citizens sampled at the building level in the 2010 French
regional elections and reported an effect of 0.4 percentage points with a standard error of 0.8 on
voting in the ﬁrst round of the elections from living in a building treated by the partisan
campaign.
Also in France, Pons20 conducted a door-to-door canvassing experiment in co-operation with
Hollande’s 2012 presidential campaign. The study encompassed 2,660 precincts. Due to
imperfect compliance by the canvassers, Pons21 suggests scaling the CACE with a factor of 2.2.
This gives a CACE estimate of 0.5 percentage points with a standard error of 0.7.
A recent study of the 2014 European Parliament election in Sweden analyzes partisan
canvassing among 10,897 individuals.22 It demonstrates an ITT effect of 2.3 percentage points
and a CACE of 3.6 percentage points with a standard error of 1.9.
17 John and Brannan 2008.
18 Ramiro, Morales, and Jiménez-Buedo 2012.
19 Pons and Liegey 2016.
20 Pons 2016.
21 Pons 2016.
22 Nyman 2014.
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Foos and John23 present a study of partisan door-to-door canvassing in the British European
Parliament elections in 2014. Voters who received a leaﬂet and an attempt was made to contact
them were 3.7 percentage points less likely to vote than voters in the control group. They
estimate a CACE of −8.5 percentage points and a standard error of 4.3.24
Finally,25 Cantoni and Pons26 had volunteers and candidates canvass voters in one
municipality in Italy’s European and municipality elections of 2014. They found that volunteers
increased turnout, while candidates failed to produce an effect. The volunteer canvassers had an
ITT of 1.8 percentage points, while the effect for the candidates was −0.2 percentage points.
The contact rates were 35.9 and 45.5 per cent, respectively. When we convert the ITTs to the
CACEs27 and weigh them by their precision, we get a pooled CACE of 2.7 percentage points
with a standard error of 1.7.
New Studies from Denmark
In addition to the existing studies, we present two experiments conducted in the 19 November
2013 Danish municipal elections. Danish municipal elections are held simultaneously every
fourth year on the third Tuesday of November in ninety-eight municipalities. Each municipality
is one multimember district, in which mandates are distributed proportionally by D’Hondt’s rule
and candidates run on either semi-open or open lists. The national political parties dominate the
municipal councils, though local lists have some inﬂuence in a minority of the municipalities.
Even though municipal elections do not receive the same level of attention as national elections,
and the elections may be considered as second order, it is fair to say that the municipalities are
an important part of the public sector in Denmark. The public sector is very decentralized and
municipalities have the authority to levy taxes under restrictions from the central government
and administer about 30 per cent of the entire GDP. Turnout usually ﬂuctuates around 70 per
cent. In 2013, the national average was 71.9 per cent with considerable variation between the
municipalities from 61.2 per cent turning out to vote in Copenhagen to 85.4 per cent on the
small island municipality of Fanoe; 5.3 per cent of the votes cast were early votes.
Data on voter turnout stems from the voter lists. All eligible voters are automatically
registered. When citizens vote, they are marked on the voter lists. Some municipalities use
electronic voter lists, and voters are marked by scanning the barcode on the polling card. After
the election, we collected the voter ﬁles from all ninety-eight municipalities. Where manual lists
were used, the municipalities digitized them before submitting them for research. While a few
lists were lost due to administrative errors at the polling places, we gained access to individual-
level turnout information for about 99 per cent of all eligible citizens (4.36 million individuals).
The voter lists were then matched with information on treatment status from the experiments,
and ﬁnally were anonymously merged with detailed socio-demographic information from
Statistics Denmark, the government statistics bureau.28
23 Foos and John 2016.
24 We are grateful to Florian Foos for providing these estimates.
25 Braconnier, Dormagen, and Pons (2016) study the effect of canvassing on voter registration and subsequent
turnout in France. However, in a European context, voter registration is an unusual requirement for voting. Thus
we ﬁnd that their study does not conform with representative European GOTV studies. Therefore we do not
include it in the meta-analysis.
26 Cantoni and Pons 2016.
27 We divide the IIT by the contact rate. Usually this would give a consistent estimate of the CACE (Gerber
and Green 2012, 151).
28 Bhatti et al. 2014a; Hansen 2016.
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Study 1: Non-partisan Mobilization in Copenhagen
‘We Vote Together’ (in Danish ‘Vi stemmer sammen’) was a non-partisan door-to-door
canvassing campaign run by researchers from the University of Copenhagen (the authors).
The campaign was carried out the weekend before election day. In the experiment, a randomly
selected treatment group of households received visits from two canvassers recruited mainly
among current and former students at the University of Copenhagen. The canvassers were
volunteers, primarily students, and received a brief introduction to the project and the
randomized design as well as a short script. The canvassers went over the script but did not
rehearse it. They were told that they were free to do the canvassing as they pleased and that the
script was for inspiration. They were required to encourage people to vote and hand out a ﬂyer
at the door. They were also instructed not to leave ﬂyers with voters who did not open the door.
The selected group of interest was 3,402 households in the Østerbro neighborhood in the
capital, Copenhagen. All voters in a household were assigned the same treatment status as the
household. The area’s turnout was average for Copenhagen but below the national turnout
level.29 The target population was divided into eighteen routes. Each route consisted of
189 households; ninety were randomly selected to the treatment group and ninety-nine to the
control group. In total, 1,620 households with 2,167 eligible citizens were selected to the
treatment group, whereas 1,782 households with 2,345 citizens were in the control group;
36 per cent of the households in the treatment group were successfully contacted. The ITT was
−0.8 percentage points. A consistent estimator for the CACE is to divide the ITT by the contact
rate.30 That gives a CACE of −2.1 percentage points with a standard error of 4.6. A more
elaborate description of the results is available in the online appendix.
Study 2: Mobilization by Labor Market Union in Randers
A local youth branch of one of the largest labor market unions in Denmark (3F Ungdom,
Randers) launched a door-to-door mobilization campaign before the election. The target group
was the youth organization’s own members, who were all between eighteen and thirty years of
age. Canvassers were trained to introduce themselves at the door, and to listen and establish a
pleasant conversation. They were instructed to deliver an appeal in two parts: ﬁrst, to encourage
voting and tell the voter why it was important to the canvasser that some of the candidates
elected would work to promote issues of interest to the youth labor market union and its
members. Secondly, the voters were offered a list of forty-seven recommended candidates from
a broad spectrum of the running parties. A total of 194 candidates ran in the municipality.
Randomization was carried out at the household level to overcome issues of within-
household spillover. The randomization was based on the organization’s member list, which
contained the same personal identiﬁer that was in the general public records. This made it
straightforward to merge the ﬁle with the above-described turnout data. As the treatment
directly targeted individual citizens, only members of the organization are considered in the
experiment. Other voters who resided at the same address are not considered as part of either
the treatment or control group. A few households contained more than one member of the
organization. We randomly selected 440 households (454 eligible citizens) to the treatment
group, whereas the control group consisted of 439 households (451 eligible citizens).
Canvassers were instructed to ask for the member in question, but if anyone in the household
29 In the control group, 61.8 per cent turned out compared to 71.9 in the country at large.
30 Gerber and Green 2012, 151.
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opened the door it was considered treated. In the few multimember households, only the person
answering the door was generally involved in the conversation.
The contact rate, deﬁned as anyone in the household answering the door, was 24 per cent.
The ITT was −3.8 percentage points. Due to the low contact rate the CACE is estimated
to be −15.4 percentage points, however the standard error is 13.9, which can be ascribed to a
combination of the limited sample size and relatively low contact rate. Once again, we refer to
the online appendix for a more elaborate description.
META-ANALYSIS
In Table 1, we compile evidence from the previous studies and the two new studies. In addition to
the scarcity of European experiences, we notice that all the studies are from Western Europe. This
limitation is worth keeping in mind as we evaluate the compiled evidence. We can combine the
studies for which we have an estimate of the CACE in a ﬁxed-effects meta-analysis.31
The precision-weighted average of the CACE is 0.78 percentage points with a 95 per cent CI from
−0.16 to 1.71 percentage points. The point estimate is well below the general point estimate from
the American literature. If we exclude John and Brannan’s32 (UK) study from the meta-analysis
reported by Green, McGrath and Aronow,33 the precision-weighted estimate for the American
studies is 2.50 percentage points with a 95 per cent CI of (1.77, 3.22). A simulation-based
test of the difference between the distributions gives a p-value of 0.002 when testing if the
American estimate is greater than the European.34 This difference between the European
and American studies is even without Ramiro, Morales and Jiménez-Buedo,35 who found a
negative effect estimate but did not include a CACE estimate that can easily be implemented in the
meta-analysis.
The European CI is considerably wider than that of the CI from the American literature,
reﬂecting the small number of European studies to date. There is thus a need for further studies
in a European context. In Figure 1, we have compiled all the studies included in the European
meta-analysis along with the pooled European and American estimates. The ﬁgure conﬁrms that
we cannot infer with certainty that the effect in Europe is positive; nor can we be certain that the
effect is indeed smaller than in the United States, especially because the European results
depend on a few large-scale studies. Keeping these uncertainties in mind, the best estimate is
still that there is a small and positive effect, though it is substantially smaller than what has been
observed in the United States.
The meta-analysis ignores any heterogeneity between the effects. One might question the
external validity, and whether we can even compare effects from relatively diverse countries as
France, Sweden, Britain, Italy and Denmark. The p-value for a test of the heterogeneity of the
effects is 0.062, suggesting that there might be some heterogeneity in effects that future studies
31 Gerber and Green 2012, 361.
32 John and Brannan 2008.
33 Green, McGrath, and Aronow 2013.
34 We ran a simulation test in which we took a draw from each of two normal distributions with means and
standard errors equal to the European and American CACE estimates, respectively. We repeated this 1,000,000
times to ﬁnd that in just 0.2 per cent of the draws, the draw from the European distribution was greater than the
draw from the American distribution. In the notes for Table 1, we highlight that we could alternatively arrive at a
different estimate if we change our assumptions concerning Pons and Liegey (2016) and Pons (2016). If we base
our evaluation on the larger and more imprecise estimate of 1.56 with a standard error of 0.78, in 13.9 per cent of
our draws the estimate for Europe is greater than for the United States. Thus while it is clear that the point
estimate is lower in Europe, we cannot conclude with certainty that the effect is smaller than in the United States.
35 Ramiro, Morales, and Jiménez-Buedo 2012.
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TABLE 1 Overview of Previous European Door-to-Door Studies
Study Context CACEa (st. error)
Control group
turnout (%) Total N
Contact
rate (%)
John and Brannan (2008) Households in one constituency in British 2005
general election
6.7 46.3 2,510 54
(3.7)
Ramiro, Morales and
Jiménez-Buedo (2012)
One city in 2011 Spanish local elections Not reported.
ITT = −1.6b
67.5 26 census sections −
Pons and Liegey (2016) Citizen clustered by building in eight cities in French
2010 regional election
0.4 34.2 23,773 voters clustered in
1,347 buildings
49
(0.8)c
Pons (2016) Nationwide with treatment by precinct in French
2012 presidential election
0.5 80.8 2,660 precincts 48
(0.7)c
Nyman (2015) One county in 2015 Swedish European Parliament
election
3.6 45.3 10,897 63
(1.9)
Foos and John (2016) 2014 British European election in one constituency −8.5 30.7 6,127 42.9
(4.3)
Cantoni and Pons (2016) 2014 Italian Municipality and European election in
one municipality
2.7 74.7 26,352 45.5
35.9d(1.7)
Bhatti et al. (2014b),
Copenhagen
2013 election in Copenhagen municipality −2.1 61.8 4,512 36
(4.6)
Bhatti et al. (2014b), Randers 2013 election in Randers municipality −15.4 53.6 904 24
(13.9)
Meta-analysis 0.78
(0.48)
aPercentage points. bStandard errors not reported. cCanvassers did not strictly adhere to the experimental protocol which is taken into account in the
calculation of the CACE. For Pons and Liegey (2016) we use the IV estimate accounting for this and for Pons (2016) we use the recommended
imperfect compliance multiplier of 2.2. We do not adjust for non-complying households because non-compliers were provided with treatment material.
However, if we do so anyway, the pooled effect increases to 1.56 (standard error 0.78). dCantoni and Pons (2016) randomly assign households to
volunteer and candidate canvassers and only report separate effects. The CACE for volunteer canvassers is 5.0 with a standard error of 2.2. The effect for
candidate canvassers is −0.4 with a standard error of 2.6. The table presents a precision-weighted average of the CACE and its standard error. The contact
rates are split for candidates and volunteers, the latter in italics.
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can explore. Though Fieldhouse et al.36 ﬁnd that geographical context moderates effects in a
population-based experiment using mailings and phone calls in Britain only to a limited extent,
there could be heterogeneity across countries.
One source of heterogeneity could be salience or turnout levels. This could also help explain the
smaller effects in Europe. Turnout in many of the elections in question is at least comparable to a
high-turnout American election. Above we suggested that one of the reasons we might not expect
effects similar to those in the United States is that the results could be subject to a ceiling effect. To
examine this possibility, we plot the CACEs against the control groups’ turnout rates in Figure 2.
The size of each point is proportional to the estimate’s precision. Furthermore, the ﬁtted line is
from a regression of CACE on control group turnout weighted by precision. Figure 2 reveals a
practically ﬂat relationship between turnout in the control group and the effect size. However,
control group turnout rates are not randomly assigned. Thus we cannot be certain whether effects in
contexts with low turnout rates would change if these places suddenly increased overall turnout.37
CACE
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−20 −15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15
John and Brannan (2008), England
Pons and Liegey (2016), France
Pons (2016), France
Nyman (2014), Sweden
John and Foos (2016), England
Cantoni and Pons (2016), Italy
Bhatti et al. (2014b), Denmark
Weighted European estimate
Weighted American estimate
Fig. 1. Estimates from European studies and pooled European and American estimates
Note: the bars are the 95 per cent CIs. The box is centered at the best estimate and its area is scaled by its
precision.
36 Fieldhouse et al. 2014.
37 Green and Geber (2008, 174) ﬁnd a curvilinear relationship between control group turnout and the effect of
mobilization from US door-to-door campaigns, suggesting that it is harder to mobilize in very low and very high
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We have also gone back to the US door-to-door studies included in the Green, McGrath and
Aronow meta-analysis and added control group turnout to their dataset where it was missing.38 This
allows us to analyze the relationship between CACE and turnout in the US setting. The gray
markers in Figure 2 are the US studies. The analysis ﬁnds a very weak negative relationship in these
US studies, suggesting that initial turnout level is weakly negative related to the effect of door-to-
door campaigns. Though the evidence is weak, there is a negative correlation between control group
turnout and effect size, at least in the United States. Thus we cannot rule out the possibility that
differences in turnout levels are driving part of the differences in effect size. Yet the regression line
for the United States is above the European line at all levels of turnout in the control group. It is
interesting that the largest CACE is found in the only ﬁrst-past-the-post election among the
European studies, suggesting that election systems might correlate with the effects of door-to-door
canvassing, but with only one election we cannot draw any deﬁnitive conclusions.
DISCUSSION
This article contributes to the literature by compiling evidence from seven previous European
studies and two new studies. Including our two studies, we obtain a precision-weighted average
CACE of 0.78 percentage point with a 95 per cent CI from −0.16 to 1.71 percentage points.
John and Brannan (2008), England
Nyman (2014), SwedenCantoni and Pons (2016), Italy
Pons and Liegey (2016), France Pons (2016), France
Bhatti et al. (2014b), Copenhagen
Foos and John (2016), England
Bhatti et al. (2014b), Randers
−10
0
10
20
CA
CE
250 50 75
Control group turnout
US
Europe
Fig. 2. Relationship between control group turnout and effect size
Note: the points are scaled by their precision (one divided by the variance) and the regression lines are from
weighted least squares regressions with precision of point estimates as regression weights.
(F’note continued)
turnout settings with door-to-door campaigns. We tested for a curvilinear relationship (our model diverges from
Green and Gerber’s) and found a similar curvilinear relationship between the number of contacts per vote and the
control group’s turnout rate in both the European and American data. However, the relationships in our models
fall short of statistical signiﬁcance with the European data and are marginally statistically signiﬁcant in the
American data.
38 We were able to ﬁnd control group turnout for ﬁfty (mean turnout 33.9 per cent, SD 20.0) of the US studies
and add this variable to Green, McGrath, and Aronow’s (2013) original dataset. Replication data is available at
http://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/BJPolS.
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In other words, the current best estimate based on experiences from Western Europe is below
the general estimate, but is positive as in the United States. Although our ﬁndings are fragile, we
think it is important to summarize both the published and non-published evidence at the
current stage to help practitioners and scholars who are conducting GOTV research to plan
campaigns based on all the available evidence.39 A large amount of money and volunteers’ time
are spent based on the existing research, and this important addition might make some
European campaigns reconsider their tactics or at least think about how to measure the impact of
their efforts.
However, while these results might suggest that canvassing is less effective in Europe than
the United States, the ﬁndings cannot be taken as ﬁnal proof that canvassing is ineffective in
European elections. Instead, we need more experiments in order to more precisely estimate the
effectiveness of door-to-door canvassing in Europe and to verify whether the US results can be
applied to a European context. While the collective literature on European door-to-door
canvassing effects has progressed in recent years, there are still substantial uncertainties. In
addition, we have only estimated the effect on overall mobilization. Campaigns might still
beneﬁt from door-to-door canvassing by demobilizing out-party voters,40 persuading voters to
support their party41 or only mobilizing low-propensity voters.42
There could be numerous potential explanations of the difference between the general
positive effects of door-to-door canvassing in the United States and the smaller effects in
Europe that we have presented here. The generally higher turnout in Europe might be part of the
explanation (a so-called ceiling effect), combined with the fact that most European elections are
conducted using PR systems. In the United States, we need stronger evidence of the
effectiveness of door-to-door canvassing in battleground states vs. non-battleground states, on
registered voters vs. non-registered voters, on partisan vs. non-partisan appeals, and on
canvassing conducted by candidates vs. volunteers.
Common wisdom in the American context is that door-to-door canvassing, though resource
intensive, has a sizable effect on turnout. If nothing else, our article demonstrates that
researchers and practitioners should be cautious about assuming that lessons from a US-
dominated ﬁeld can be transferred to their own countries’ contexts. The compiled evidence we
presented here demonstrates that more research is needed before we accept this to be the case in
Europe. Finally, we discuss evidence from six Western European countries. The effect of door-
to-door canvassing in the rest of Europe is a question for further investigation.
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